

MCA TODAY

News from the Michigan Corrections Association

Fall 2014



Welcome to the Fall issue of MCA Today. In each issue we try to bring information to you that is a current topic in the field of Criminal Justice throughout this great State of Michigan. Our last issue was about contraband written by MCA Trustee Joe Bouchard bouchard@up.net. We would like to thank him for that great article and if you have any questions about it please email him.




This month we have a great article one of our members published in the Journal of Law Enforcement, Albert De Amicis, MPIA, MPPM has shared this article in its entirety for our members to read, learn from, and maybe start discussions at your worksite be it a county jail, Parole/Probation office, police department, court, or other Criminal Justice agency in Michigan.

Past ACA President, and former Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections has now published a book titled: "Jackson: The Rise and Fall of The World's Largest Walled Prison: A history and a memoir" It is available in paperback at Amazon.

<http://www.amazon.com/Jackson-Worlds-Largest-Walled-history/dp/0692261567>

Perry M. Johnson started his career in corrections as a counselor at Jackson Prison (SPSM) in 1955. He has served the prison as the Deputy Warden, Administrative Assistant to the Warden and Warden – before moving on to oversee all of Michigan's prisons and eventually becoming Director of the Department of Corrections. In 1977 he was the first recipient of the Award for Distinguished Service to the State given at the annual National Governors' Conference. In his chosen field of corrections, he has served on the Board of Directors of The American Correctional Association, and as President of that Association, he helped develop standards for correctional institutions which have resulted in the upgrading of many of North America's prisons. His accomplishments were recognized by his peers by giving him the E.R. Cass Award, the highest honor in the profession.



We are always looking for material to publish in the MCA Today. If you have an article or know someone who has please send it to a member of the MCA Board for review. We will let you know if we will publish it and when. Thank you for being a member of MCA and supporting your fellow practitioners in Criminal Justice.

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The Dangerous Duty of Restrictive Housing Units

Albert De Amicis, MPIA, MPPM

ABSTRACT

This paper embodies how Restrictive Housing Units (RHU) in the correctional system

contributes to the security and smooth overall operation for any institution at the local, state and federal levels. This paper examines the Federal Bureau of Prisons Segregation Units that have come under scrutiny by the General Accounting Office (GAO) report, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and other advocate groups. This paper provides three scenarios, all of which have occurred in local, state, and federal prison systems. The violent and unmanageable inmates portrayed in the scenarios provided evidence as to why segregation units are important and why such major controls are implemented by policy. Even with stringent policies in place, and the

tightest controls in these units, violent staff assaults and the loss of life still occurs at the hands of these dangerous individuals. Case scenario documentation supports why certain inmates should never be placed in general population to guarantee the security of the institution and the safety of staff and inmates alike. Lastly, correctional, criminology professionals, and advocate groups have lodged concerns about inmates who spend a lengthy sentence in Special Housing Units (SHUs) and then are released back to society from a very violent environment such as Pelican Bay State Prison's Security Housing Unit. Pilot programs have been recently initiated at the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in similar step down programs used as a reentry back into general population, and ultimately, back into society after the inmate(s) have been released from incarceration.

(This paper should not to be quoted or cited without authorization by this author.)

The Dangerous Duty of Restrictive Housing Units/De Amicis

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Introduction

Correctional professionals often consider the most dangerous tour of duty as time spent working inside the Special Housing Units (SHUs), Special Management Units (SMUs), or any other type of Restrictive Housing Units (RHUs) within their respective institutions. Like other businesses or concerns, corrections receive outside scrutiny. Management and staff have the task of maintaining a safe and secure environment for employees, visitors, and those in custody. Outside groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and other advocate groups try to dictate through the courts and media how correctional facilities should operate. One area under attack is the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU). As a former captain in charge of the Disciplinary Housing Unit for 6 years at the Allegheny County Jail, (now called the Allegheny County Bureau of Corrections) located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, I know

firsthand of the dangers. Examples will be provided of appalling and not particular uncommon incidents within these restricted units.

Federal Bureau of Prisons

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOPs) is presently auditing the use of solitary confinement by contracting a think tank of correctional officials from Washington, D.C. Director Charles Samuels of the FBOP made this pledge at the first Congressional hearing on solitary confinement chaired by Illinois Senator Dick Durbin. Samuels was asked under direct questioning, how many people in isolation suffered from mental illness. Samuels acknowledged that he did not have the answer and he had also lacked details of the FBOP's use of solitary confinement. Later on, when Samuels again testified before Congress, he did discuss under headings: Recent Innovations and Achievements. "We are in the midst of making significant changes to our Special Housing Unit (SHU) policies and procedures." This audit was discretely set in motion and will take approximately up to one year to complete (Ridgeway and Casella, 2013). The majority of inmates placed in segregation units are high risk and often extremely dangerous. In the Bureau of Prisons there are three main types of housing units used for segregation: Special Housing units (SHUs); Special Management Units (SMUs); and Florence Administrative Max Facility (ADX) (Government Accounting Office (GAO), 2013) According to Bureau of Prison (FBOP) policy, all three units are used for the same objective: "to separate inmates from the general inmate population to maintain the safety security, and the orderly operation of FBOP facilities, and protect the public." Each of these segregated units varies in placement and conditions of confinement. Additionally, the SHUs, SMUs, and ADX inmates are confined to their cells approximately 23 hours per day (GAO, 2013). The FBOP's custody

levels in the SHUs, SMUs, and the ADX are: Administrative Detention (AD) and Disciplinary Segregation (DS). Administrative detention (AD) addresses inmates whose security classification or reclassifications are pending. These inmates may be in a holdover status or waiting transfer to another facility. These inmates may be removed from the general inmate population because of the threat they may pose to inmates or staff. This form of custody is intended to be temporary, not punitive (GAO, 2013).

Every correctional institution is governed by rules and regulations regarding the inmate population. When an inmate in the FBOP violates these rules, they are placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) under disciplinary segregation (DS) where they receive a discipline hearing. Inmates can attend this hearing, make a statement, and have the opportunity to provide any evidentiary documentation to support their case. Inmates are also permitted to request the presence of a witness and have staff representation at the hearing (GAO, 2013).

If the hearing committee finds the inmate guilty, the inmate will serve out their disciplinary sentence in the SHU. A Segregation Review Official (SRO) will review each inmate's status, generally after 7-days of continual placement, and every 30 days thereafter. The SRO will have a formal review of the inmate's status where the inmate may attend. The FBOP takes the facts under consideration and the designation or consideration of why to place an inmate in the Special Management Units (SMUs) (GAO, 2013). According to the GAO's report, they provide the following reasons (2013):

1. Participation in or leadership role in disruptive geographical group/gang related activities;
2. History of serious disruptive disciplinary infractions;

3. Committed any greatest severity level prohibited acts after being classified as a member of a disruptive group among other reasons (p-7).

The referrals of these inmates are made to the warden and the Regional Director. If the request is substantiated, the Regional Director will appoint a Hearing Administrator to conduct a hearing. A hearing will be conducted and the inmate will have the opportunity to attend, make an oral statement, present documentation, and even have a staff member present to assist them in their defense. SMU staff will review the inmates within 28 days of placement, and every 180 days thereafter. The inmates may also attend these reviews (GAO, 2013). Lastly, the FBOP's Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX) located in Florence, Colorado, houses inmates who require the tightest security controls. The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) released information just prior to the activation of the ADX in 1994, which provided an overview to the media and others interested in the new "Supermax." The ADX was designed to operate in a safe manner applicable to all legal standards and sound correctional practices. These designs were modernized to protect staff and inmates and to improve living conditions and programs for difficult inmate populations. Florence, and its predecessor, the United States Penitentiary of Marion, confines the most serious escape risks (Office of Public Affairs, 1993). Three segregation-housing units exist at the ADX Control Unit, Special Housing Unit (SHU), and the Special Security Unit (SSU). The Control Unit receives inmates who are not able to function in a less restrictive setting. The warden makes recommendations to the Regional Director who will designate a hearing administrator to conduct a hearing. Inmates may attend the hearing and can present evidence, call witnesses, and receive staff representation. Inmates are to be reviewed within 4-weeks of the inmate's placement in the unit, and will receive a copy of the reasons for the

placement and the length of the stay in the unit. There is a unit team that will conduct monthly reviews on the inmate's status, and an executive panel will give quarterly reviews (GAO, 2013).

According to the personal communication received May 21, 2014 from Robert Hood, former warden at the Florence Administration Maximum (ADX) in Florence, Colorado: The Special Housing Unit (SHU) at the ADX can house up to 68 inmates. The SHU at the ADX is used as a short-term housing unit for inmates under Disciplinary Segregation (DS) who have been found guilty of acts prohibited while housed at the ADX. Those inmates in Administrative Detention (AD) are pending internal investigations, transfers, or have other administrative issues to be addressed. All inmates housed in the SHU are fed all meals in their cells; each inmate recreates alone, and restraining devices are applied when inmates leave their cells. The difference between both custodies is that inmates in DS receive a 15-minute-telephone call every 90 days, while inmates housed in AD receive a 15-minute phone call every 30 days.

The living conditions at Florence are safer, brighter, and more spacious and climate controlled. Each inmate will be single celled (Office of Public Affairs, 1993). Hood also explained the importance of why segregation units in the ADX exist and why they are so vital for the overall security of the FBOP (2014):

Segregated units at the ADX are vital to maintain control throughout the federal prison system. The ADX currently holds 406 (.19%) of the agency's 217,000 inmates. The facility is only 83% occupied because of a strict classification system used to process known violent escape-prone offenders, gang leaders, terrorist, and spies. It is hard to get into the ADX and more difficult to be released from this prison. Unlike traditional correctional institutions, which maintain restrictive housing areas (SHU/SMU), the ADX is basically one

large lockdown prison with all inmates confined to individual cells. Based on an internal classification system, inmates may be housed in different settings (e.g., control, high security, general population, and transitional units). Regardless of the labeled unit, inmates remain in cells most of the day with all programming, meals, and staff interactions provided at the cell door. The individual units allow for separation of inmates such as the "high-profile" leaders involved in the World Trade Center bombing to individuals like Richard Reid (aka "Shoe Bomber").

The federal prison system has perfected order within the ADX (the absence of individual or group misconduct that threatens the safety of others). Amenities (e.g., anything that enhances the comfort of inmates) are kept to a minimum. Good food, recreation, in-cell programming, and access to radio/television are available. Although order and amenities provide a safe and secure prison environment, the service (e.g., anything to improve the quality of life for offenders) is lacking. Long-term incarceration in an ultra-secure setting is desired punishment for this subgroup of offenders, but the general public may not be aware of the overall impact. Some offenders will complete their sentences and return to the community. Returning to society after years in extreme isolation and sensory deprivation will impact successful reentry (R. Hood personal communication, May 21, 2014).

Lastly, a SSU exists for the referral of inmates who have more restrictive measures or special administrative measures (SAM) that have been imposed by the Attorney General. Inmates with special administrative measures will be reviewed annually to determine a SAM renewal or modification. Inmates may meet with FBOP and the FBI to provide documentation for discussion of any related issues (GAO, 2013).

Serious Correctional Staff Assault Statistics

According to Gary Harkins, Director of Research and Information for American Correctional Officer Intelligence Network (n.d.): Statistics show that on an average over a 20-year career, a correctional officer will be seriously assaulted twice in their career. In 2002 there were 33,000 assaults or 90 assaults per day occurred. There was a staggering - 3.7 assaults that happened every hour. Also, in 2002 – county and local facilities: recorded that 2.7 staff assaults per 100 inmates happened in their facilities. In State Correctional facilities: there were 1.4 staff assaults per 100 inmates. In the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) facilities: 0.9 staff assaults per 100 inmates occurred (pp-13). In 2009: County and local facilities – 20,215 estimated assaults, State facilities – 19,752 estimated assaults Federal Bureau of Prisons – estimated assaults, 1,859. The total estimated assaults per year are approximately 41,826. (Harkins, n.d., pp. 13-14)

The Worst-of-the-Worst

Working in a RHU can be a dangerous proposition. Such confined inmates have a history of being highly predatory and highly assaultive. For the most part, these inmates are locked up 23 hours a day with one hour of recreation in a caged secured area. Shakedowns and searches are routine to find dangerous contraband (e.g., weapons, drugs, and implements of escape). These units can be very volatile and can explode at any moment. Officers and staff must remain vigilant in the performance of their duties. Inmates stuff sinks and commodes and will break off sprinkler heads in their cells to flood the unit. The property damage can be very significant and costly for the correctional

institution. Certain inmates will douse you with noxious cocktails consisting of urine, semen, and feces. In some cases, inmates will spread feces on cell walls and also on their person. In our old, linear correctional facility, the Allegheny County Jail (ACJ), I was the captain in charge of our Disciplinary Housing Unit (DHU). This unit housed 40 inmates, and the maximum security A-range housed higher security inmates. The inmates that are housed in SUs are highly manipulative and very creative in a negative light. For example, shanks will be made out of any material available.

The following example illustrates the potentiality of violence inmates can possess. I observed an accused serial killer kept on A-range during my tenure at (ACJ) appear to be missing the right temple holder for his glasses. I wanted to test this individual to see if he had the part on his person or in his cell. He was asked to produce the missing part to have it repaired. He explained that he had received some bad news and became angry, and that he broke his glasses. He said he then flushed the missing part support down his commode. When dealing with these individuals, at times, you have to follow your intuition. His response sent up a red flag. I assumed that this inmate had an ulterior motive. Fellow officers escorted him to the front of the range and perform a search to make sure he did not have any weapon on his person. I personally performed a cell search where I found the dangerous weapon stashed in one of his pens. The weapon had been manufactured from his right eyeglass temple holder and resembled an ice pick type weapon. He stashed this weapon in the barrel of one of his pens and he then fastened it to the inside part of the ballpoint tip. This weapon could have been used on an officer or a fellow inmate with deadly results. These types of occurrences happen consistently in these units.

The following 3-cases will provide an example in each correctional system (e.g., local, state and federal correctional system). These individuals can be highly aggressive and dangerous, as you will see from the cases cited. The intention is to bring to light to how important these specialized units are in any correctional system. Even in the tightest of security environments, inmates have 24 hours a day to scheme and to plan an escape, or to create violent mayhem. In the prison system, real hardcore convicts feel that all they have left is what their fellow peer group perceives as how they carry themselves. The most important rule to these individuals is being a stand-up convict, and not a rat that informs on other inmates for the man (correctional staff), and inmates believe that these types of actions gives them status in the prison inmate hierarchy. These desperate men and women will find ways to breach the tightest security of these RHUs. If given free reign, many of these individuals will continue to prey on the weaker inmate(s), and will continue to use all of their cunning and manipulative skills that they have learned during their years in the penitentiary.

Case Studies

Case I: Escape at Allegheny County Jail, April 21, 1989.

Back on Friday, April 21, 1989, in our Disciplinary Housing Unit (DHU), inmates made a plan to escape. The principal players were inmates James Robinson, who was awaiting trial on charges of burglary, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. In January of 1988, Robinson was charged with the wounding of a Wilkesburg Police Detective, Channing Jackson in Manchester in the Northside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Three weeks later, in Montgomery, Alabama, police officers shot Robinson after he

allegedly tried to run the police officers over with his car (Steigerwald, 1989).

Two other principle players were Herman Wilkes of Braddock and Wayne Taylor of Beltzhoover. Wilkes was in jail for attempting to flee police custody from the Public Safety Building in downtown Pittsburgh in March of 1988. Wilkes and another prisoner attempted to escape from a basement when they grabbed a gun from an officer, but were shortly apprehended by police (Steigerwald, 1989). Earlier that day, (prior to the escape), Wilkes was sentenced to 10 consecutive 5-10 year terms for a series of robberies. Wilkes was to be transferred Monday, July 24, 1989, three days after the escape attempt to Western Penitentiary to begin his sentence (Wilhelm, 1989). Wayne Taylor was being held on charges for bank robbery and robbing several stores in downtown Pittsburgh in 1988 (Steigerwald, 1989). One of the two remaining inmates was Thomas McCullum, who confessed to the homicide and rape of Ms. Tillie Katz, an 83-year-old elderly woman from East Pittsburgh and who was awaiting trial for this criminal act. Ms. Katz was waiting for an elevator in her building when McCullum beat her with a pipe and dragged her body into the stairwell, raped her, and robbed her of \$12 (Steigerwald, 1989). David Rowkosky of Brookline, the last inmate was arrested in March (n.d.) and charged in five drug store robberies in the South Hills of Pittsburgh between the months of mid-November and mid-March (Steigerwald, 1989).

The planned escape took place on the 3-11 shift. This was a skeleton crew of only two correctional officers on duty. One officer was at dinner when the plan was executed around 7:00 p.m. that evening. According to Warden Charles Kozakiewicz's investigation, "Robinson flooded his cell, and when the officer entered his cell to investigate, the officer was overpowered and handcuffed by Robinson using the officer's own handcuffs. He took the officer's keys and locked him in

his cell" (Steigerwald, 1989, p. A-4) "Robinson then opened the other inmates cells: Herman Wilkes, Thomas McCullum, Wayne Taylor, and David Rowkosky" Kozakiewicz said (as cited in Steigerwald, 1989, p. A-4). All of these inmates were housed on A-range, a maximum-security range was designated for our highest security inmates. These inmates used bed sheets tied together to escape. After breaking into a secured storage room they were then able to procure a tool that they used to cut through the bars and mesh fencing in the DHU's outside recreation area. According to Kozakiewicz, "the officer had a hidden handcuff key in his uniform and was then able to free himself and call for assistance" (as cited in Wilhelm, 1989). Robinson was the first inmate over the wall and was observed by an outside witness who was waiting for his girlfriend to finish work. The witness observed Robinson's rope (made of bed sheets) fell well short of the sidewalk and Robinson failed to push away from the wall as he dropped 30 feet in an awkward manner. The fall broke Robinson's leg. Wilkes and Taylor then came down the rope (as cited in Wilhelm, 1989). Lieutenant Miknowski from the Pittsburgh City Police Department stated that (1989): A pedestrian witnessed their escape and hailed down a traffic officer who put over the radio and informed other police officers that an escape was in progress from the Allegheny County Jail. Taylor and Wilkes then ran to a Courier Express delivery van parked in the vicinity of the jail and assaulted the driver. The driver of the Courier Express truck was on the radio talking to dispatch when he observed Wiles and Taylor breathing heavy. The driver asked what they wanted. They told him, "get out of the truck or we'll kill you. I mean it." The driver struggled with Wilkes and Taylor momentarily and then they entered the driver's van and told him "to slide over (as cited in Steigerwald, 1989, p. A-4). The driver gave up on the fight and let them have the van. A motorcycle police officer arrived on the scene and was attempting to

draw down on the two escapees when they sped away and crashed into another vehicle. The escapees tried to pull away, but the driver involved in the collision alertly blocked them with his car. Wilkes and Taylor jumped out of the vehicle and attempted to elude the police. Both were quickly captured and returned to the Allegheny County Jail (Steigerwald, 1989).

Rowkosky and McCullum were also attempting an escape from the DHU yard and were apprehended by correctional officers. No correctional officers were seriously injured. The following cases involving two correctional officers who paid the ultimate price at the hands of the most violent inmate(s) that a correctional system might spawn.

Every time corrections personnel enter those corrections gates, the possibility does exist that they might not return home to their families. These are just two cases of the many that have occurred, that have resulted in the murder of a correctional officer. These cases will support why aggressive and dangerous inmates are secured in segregated units, and why controls of the highest of security is implemented and required. Restrictive Housing Units are vital in maintaining the overall security of any correctional institution by isolating these inmates for the safety of staff and inmates alike. These actions guarantee the good order and smooth operation of any correctional institution.

Case II: Murder at Western Penitentiary

In 1969, Stanley Hoss, one of the main participants in Lieutenant Peterson's murder, was a dangerous career criminal. Hoss' criminal career gained national attention when he executed a daring escape with another inmate, Thomas Lubresky from the Allegheny County Workhouse, located in Blawnox, Pennsylvania. After the escape, Hoss split from Lubresky and went on a nationwide crime spree, which resulted in the murder of Officer Joseph Zanella of the Verona Police Department. Officer Zanella pulled Hoss over

after observing the escapee's vehicle and the license plate number for his vehicle that matched the information for the escapee. When he approached Hoss's vehicle, he was shot and killed by Hoss. After Officer Zanella's murder, Hoss continued on his crime spree and headed towards Maryland. He then encountered a young mother and her daughter, Linda and Lori Peugeot, in a shopping center in the State of Maryland. He kidnapped them at gunpoint, and was eventually captured in Waterloo, Iowa. Linda and Lori Peugeot's bodies were never found and Hoss would never stand trial for their alleged kidnapping and murders. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced for Officer Zanella's murder and also for a myriad of additional crimes. Hoss was then sentenced to Western Penitentiary where the murder of Captain Peterson would take place. On December 10, 1973, Lieutenant (Lt.) Walter Peterson was an African American posthumously promoted to the rank of Captain subsequently after a heinous murderous act that was committed. Lieutenant Peterson was brutally murdered in a racially, motivated act by three white inmates (e.g., Stanley Hoss, Danny Delker and George Butler). A fourth inmate, Bob McGrogan, (also in the BAU recreation room), was brought into the plan because he was white and had killed twice before in the prison system. McGrogan was afraid to leave for fear that they would kill him and, because of his fear, he did not leave the area. These men were incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Behavior Adjustment Unit (BAU) at Western Penitentiary located in Pittsburgh, PA.

As told by Jim Hollock, author of *Born to Lose: Stanley Hoss and the Crime Spree That Gripp'd a Nation*, a plan was calculated to lure Lt. Peterson to the basement of the B.A.U., which was used for recreation. When Lt. Peterson arrived, the vicious attack was launched. Another officer posted in the basement could partially see the beating, but could not get to Peterson because he was

locked in an observation area. This officer, "Bus" Reilly, was horrified and yelled, "Hoss! Hoss! Hoss!" into his intercom that was linked to fellow officers upstairs (Hollock, 2011).

In the Home Block's basement there was a design flaw with a two-door set-up, which was discovered by the inmates. The inner door consisted of very thick vertical bars and the outer door had a small, seven-inch square window made of thick glass at eye level view. The door was made of solid steel. The inmates were able to exploit this design flaw. Moments after the attack began, Hoss shouted out orders to Butler to tie the door. Butler then double looped the bed sheet through the brass handle. This made it possible to secure this bed sheet to the door. The sheet was then secured to the bars with several knots preventing anyone from accessing the recreation room from the outside (Hollock, 2011). After Butler accomplished this, he then joined in on the assault with Hoss and Delker. Once the alarm was sounded, Sergeant Doug Cameron arrived to find the door shut tighter than a drum and it could not be opened. A desperate contingent of officers led by Lieutenant Charles Kozakiewicz arrived outside the basement door. They tried everything to gain entrance, but the door could not be opened. The assault then escalated with the use of razor blades that Butler had stashed in his tobacco pack, and this vicious attack on Lt. Petersons continued. Lt. Peterson was brutalized by these killers and finally succumbed to the vicious attack and was laid to rest (Hollock, 2011).

Since Peterson's death his three murderers were transported to the Allegheny County Jail for court appearances. These criminals were so dangerous to public safety that the Pennsylvania State Police escorted them with three separate vehicles. The convict(s) would be in the middle car. The Pittsburgh City Police were responsible for setting up an outside perimeter around the jail to control

any outside traffic entering the area. Other departments were involved and had police snipers perched on roofs surrounding the jail. These convicts were secured in our Selective Housing Unit on D-Range, a maximum-security area. Warden James Jennings put out an order that a correctional officer was to be posted in front of their cell(s) 24-7. At times, I was assigned to that detail. I remember observing Stanley Hoss working out in his cell for hours by doing hundreds of push-ups, dips, and other exercises. He made statements that, he was going to attempt to pull the bars out of the wall and kill another correctional officer. Hoss never delivered on that threat, and met his fate as described in this final section.

In his trial for the Peterson murder, Danny Delker testified that he "solely committed the murder." Delker and Butler were convicted of first-degree murder in the Peterson case and both received life sentences. Hoss was not guilty of first-degree murder, but the jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to a 10-20 year sentence to run consecutive to his life sentence for the 1969 killing of a police officer. In Butler's case, the additional life sentence was given on top of his previous life sentence for the homicide of two elderly innkeepers. Lastly, McGrogan was acquitted of the first-degree murder charge (Hollock, 2011). Hoss and Butler are now deceased. Hoss prisoner # P-0310 was locked in isolation for 2,311 days, until he took his own life. He was found on December 6, 1978, five years after Peterson's murder, hanging dead in his cell. The following message was scrawled on his cell wall: "I cannot deny this urge to die, to put an end to what has been then agony called life."

George Butler was confined in isolation for 28 years. In June 2001, and still in character, he spewed out hateful epitaphs until an aortic aneurysm burst and he died. The third and last killer, inmate Danny Delker remained incarcerated and secured in a RHU in the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections for 41 years since the horrific murder. Delker is likely the longest serving prisoner held in isolation in the United States, and perhaps in the world (Hollock, 2011).

Case III: Murder at the United States Federal Penitentiary of Marion

The last case occurred in the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1978, where “Terrible” Tommy Silverstein was serving a 15-year sentence in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas for bank robbery. In February of 1979, an internal investigation showed Silverstein stabbed and killed a fellow inmate named Danny Atwell. Silverstein was then transferred to the Control Unit at the United States Federal Penitentiary of Marion, Illinois (Thomas Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2014).

In 1981, inmates Thomas Silverstein and Clayton Fountain were charged in the killing of a black inmate, Robert Chappelle, by strangling him in his cell during an exercise period as a favor to the Mexican Mafia, a notorious prison gang. Silverstein and Fountain then killed another inmate by the name of Raymond Cadillac Smith, leader of the prison gang the D.C Blacks. Smith was stabbed 67 times from manufactured shanks and towel racks. He was a friend of Chappelle’s who was bent on seeking revenge for the killing of Chappelle. This gained Silverstein an additional life sentence. It was here that Silverstein hatched his plan to kill Correctional Officer Merle Clutts. Silverstein spent the following months plotting Clutts’ murder (Thomas Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons 2014).

The FBOP implemented a new security measure in using three unarmed correctional officers to escort Silverstein and Fountain. The duo was handcuffed every time they were escorted to the recreation room, law library, or the shower. In October of 1983, Silverstein

and Fountain were being escorted (by three officers) from the shower to Silverstein’s cell. Silverstein stopped in front of another inmate’s cell where a shank had been protruding from the inmate’s waistband. Silverstein then grabbed the shank and attacked Officer Clutts, who was one of the three escorting officers. He stabbed Officer Clutts 29 times. Silverstein again was convicted, and is now serving three life sentences, plus another 45 years of incarceration (Thomas Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons 2014).

Silverstein had been transferred from USP Marion to the Control Unit in Atlanta, Georgia. In 1984, a memorandum was issued by the then Director of the FBOP, that Silverstein was to be housed in a special unit designed for his non-contact status, limiting his visits and restricting recreation and programing. After 3 years in Atlanta, he was transferred to Leavenworth, and then finally, to the ADX in Florence, Colorado. He has been at the ADX since July 12, 2005 (Thomas Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons 2014).

Silverstein attempted to petition the courts to transfer his incarceration from solitary confinement. In his most recent attempt, Silverstein petitioned the Denver Circuit Court of Appeal’s. The Court’s decision is explained in the follow excerpt:

Silverstein petitioned the Denver-based 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals who recently ruled that the 30-year solitary confinement of Thomas Silverstein — who has been convicted in three murders, including one of a corrections officer — does not violate Silverstein’s constitutional rights. The judges noted that Silverstein, 62, has been implicated in two other killings and was reputed to once be a leader of a white supremacist prison gang. Those factors make it reasonable to keep Silverstein in solitary confinement, the judges ruled, not just for the safety of others but also for his own safety In this case, the risk of death and physical or psychological

injury to those exposed to Mr Silverstein must be balanced with the psychological risk he may face if left in administrative segregation (R. Hood personal communication, May 26, 2014).

Conclusion

The correctional system can be a very dangerous proposition, as seen in the three cases featured. When dealing with the most dangerous inmates, everyone having contact must be cognizant of the inherent danger that these individuals pose. Inmates are secured in the Special Housing Units in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) such as Pelican Bay State Prison located in Crescent City, California. They incarcerate some of the most difficult Security Threat Group's (STGs) maximum-security leaders in these units. A security threat group (STG) expert defined the following: A security threat group (STG) is any group of three (3) or more persons with recurring threatening or disruptive behavior (i.e., violations of the disciplinary rules where said violations were openly known or conferred benefit upon the group would suffice for a prison environment), including but not limited to gang crime or gang violence (i.e., crime of any sort would automatically make the group a gang, and as a gang in custody it would logically be an STG (Knox, 2012).

These STG leaders, such as La Nuestra Familia, Mexican Mafia, Nazi Low Riders, and the Aryan Brotherhood to mention a few. These are some of the deadliest individuals to staff and inmates that the CDCR has in the system. In a well-known FBI prison gang case dubbed "Operation Black Widow," it was documented that these gang members would stop at nothing to advance their criminal enterprise even from their prison cells. This investigation determined that leaders from La

Nuestra Familia directed and orchestrated murders, drug deals, and robberies from behind the isolation of the Security Housing Unit (SHU) at California's Pelican Bay State Prison (Reynolds. & Sanchez, 2003).

Certain advocate groups believe that these units actually create a much more violent inmate. This paper will address just how deadly the prison environment is to correctional officers and inmates, and will hopefully enlighten outside organizations and individuals to all the dangers behind bars. As correctional professionals, we can never lose sight that these individuals are responsible for their own actions, and because of those actions, they end up isolated and secured in segregation for the safety of the correctional facility. However, the PA Department of Corrections and the CDCR has initiated a step down process for those hardcore individuals housed in special housing units.

In the PA DOC there are approximately 3,207 validated STG members. Some of these STGs consist of the Latin Kings, Crips, Bloods, Aryan Brotherhood, and other groups. The State Correctional Institution of Greene (SCI Greene) recently initiated a new pilot program by having the first Security Threat Group Management Unit (STGMU) in the PA DOC. A second unit will be opening shortly (DeAmicis, 2013). This STGMU Unit has a maximum of 96 inmates. According to Payla the STGMU Manager: Inmates that have exhibited disruptive, violent behavior; due to repeated disciplinary actions or investigations; or pose a threat to the orderly running of the facility are placed into the STMGU (as cited in De Amicis, 2013). The objective is to re-integrate these individuals back into general population and back into society.

When referencing the STGMU Inmate Handbook, this STGMU program consists of five phases. The following reflects three selected categories, out of the 21 total categories listed in the handbook These three examples show the readers how these

inmates progress through this process. There is an estimated average progression of 3-6 months between each phase:

Security Threat Group Management Unit Privileges and Services & Visit

Phase 5: The process is initiated. Inmates have one non-contact visit per month, immediate visits with family, and religious advisor, weekday. Attorney visits are excluded from the one non-contact visit.

Phase 4: Two-non-contact visits per month, immediate family, and religious advisor during the weekday. Attorney visits are excluded from this count.

Phase 3: Three-non-contact visits per month, any approved visitor (e.g., two for the weekday/one for the weekend). Attorney visits are excluded from this count.

Phase 2: One-non-contact visit per week – any approved visitor for the weekday, weekend and holiday.

Phase 1: Inmates have general population privileges.

Exercise Privileges

Phase 5: One-hour, five days per week in a single exercise yard.

Phase 4: One-hour, five days per week in a single exercise yard.

Phase 3: One-hour, five days per week in single exercise yard or AC group.

Phase 2: One-hour, five days per week in AC Group Yard.

Phase 1: General Population Privileges.

Education Privileges

Phase 5: No privileges.

Phase 4: In-cell or individual treatment cell, may use education modules supervised by educational staff.

Phase 3: In-cell activities and one 30-minute Dual DX group per week (supervised and unrestrained).

Phase 2: In-cell activities and one 30-minute out of cell contact per week with tutor and monthly contact by educational staff.

Phase 1: General Population Privileges (DeAmicis, 2013).

On the West Coast, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) certified a similar step down program that uses privileges through enhancements that enable inmates to reintegrate back into the general population environment (State of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2012). The implementation of this pilot program will reduce long-term confinement in Security Housing Units (SHUs) throughout the CDCR by revamping the method of how gangs are being managed. The pilot program is known as the “Security Threat Group Identification, Prevention and Management.” This program was certified on October 18, 2012, by the Office of Administrative Law, and was filed with the Secretary of State (CDCR Today, 2012).

Finally, for example, an inmate may be locked-up in the SHU at Pelican Bay for a 10-year sentence, and when the inmate’s time ends, the inmate is released directly from the SHU, which is a highly violent environment, back into society. Correctional professionals and criminologists have evaluated the impact released inmates will have once reintegrated back into society without recidivating back into the system. With this new pilot program at the CDCR this could be a much more feasible

and a more realistic approach. Inmates may be able to benefit more with the option of this step-down program through enhancements that enable the inmates to reintegrate back into a general population environment versus them being directly released to society from the violent atmosphere in the CDCR's SHUs. The answer depends on those inmates who are unreachable. There lies a very strong possibility that these hardened criminals

cannot be rehabilitated and will recidivate back into the prison system.

*Captain Walter L. Peterson Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, Pennsylvania
End of Watch: Monday, December 10, 1973*

*Correctional Officer Merle E. Clutts
United States Department of Justice - Federal
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Government
End of Watch: Saturday, October 22, 1983*

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CONFERENCE INFORMATION

We are exploring ideas for a possible fall/winter/spring conference 2014/2015. We are looking for your ideas for a conference topic you feel is important in your field, If you have ideas or are interested in helping please let us know by contacting Tony Owen at mcatowen@charter.net or any of the other Board members above.



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